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Abstract The primary tasks of a cognitive system is
to survive and to maximize a life-long utility function,
like the number of offsprings. A direct computational
maximization of life-long utility is however not possi-
ble in complex environments, especially in the context,
of real-world time constraints. The central role of emo-
tions is to serve as an intermediate layer in the space
of policies available to agents and animals, leading to a
large dimensional reduction of complexity.
We review our current understanding of the func-
tional role of emotions, stressing the role of the neuro-
modulators mediating emotions for the diffusive home-
ostatic control system of the brain. We discuss a recent
proposal, that emotional diffusive control is character-
ized, in contrast to neutral diffusive control, by inter-
action effects, viz by interferences between emotional
arousal and reward signaling. Several proposals for the
realization of synthetic emotions are discussed in this
context, together with key open issues regarding the in-
terplay between emotional motivational drives and dif-
fusive control.
Keywords diffusive emotional control · synthetic
emotions · cognitive system theory · motivational
problem
1 INTRODUCTION
The apparent dichotomy between the progression of hu-
man cognitive achievments during the last millenia and
the pervasiveness of affective behavioral patterns in ev-
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eryday life has fascinated philosophers from the begin-
ning of times and is subject to libraries of literature.
Quite often it is assumed in this context, that the emo-
tional groundings of human behavior are somehow a
leftover heritage from our more ‘animal-like’ predeces-
sors, and that ‘rational behavior’ is more appropriate
for humans and ‘superior’ to affective conducts.
This popular appraisal of emotions is however ut-
terly wrong, since emotional control has functional pur-
poses which are indispensable for full fledged cognitive
systems and which cannot be substituted by cognitive
information processing. We review here our current un-
derstanding of the human emotional control system,
from the functional point of view, including consider-
ations from dynamical systems theory. The emphasis
will be on general properties, being of possible relevance
not only for the understanding of the brain but also for
eventual human-level artificial intelligences.
The emotional control system is, from the evolution-
ary perspective, a specialization of homeostatic control.
Myriads of auto-regulative processes are maintaining
our bodily functions at every moment and we are con-
scious of only a small subset having an emotional con-
text. The question then arises which traits are charac-
teristic for automatic and which for emotional homeo-
static processes. In this context we discuss a recent pro-
posal suggesting that emotional processes have a genet-
ically determined preferred level of activation and are
characterized by interaction effects within the homeo-
static control system, whereas neural control processes
are void of any genetically preferred levels of activation.
21.1 Functional emotions
We are around nowadays only because our ancestors
managed to survive and to produce offsprings, the basic
prerequisites for evolutionary fitness. Daily survival can
be regarded as a homeostatic process for keeping the ba-
sic bodily parameters, via interaction with the environ-
ment, in their proper range. Being a product of evolu-
tionary selection processes, the emotional constituents
of our self must necessarily contribute to survivability
[1].1 One can therefore classify the overall functionality
of our emotional control system as homeostatic [2,3].2
The perspective of this short review is the functional
role of emotions. Instead of the plain expression “emo-
tions”we will be using mainly the terminology “emo-
tional control system”, which reflects more precisely
the functional role of emotions as part of the home-
ostatic control system of the brain. Emotions are part
of the web of physical and biochemical processes occur-
ring which, as a whole is denoted “cognitive system” [4].
The cognitive system has the task to keep its support
unit (the body) alive, as well as its wetware (the brain).
A cognitive system is what has been called ‘organis-
mic’ in the framework of enactive artificial intelligences
[5,6]. The term cognitive system places then empha-
sis on the dynamical system perspective; the physical
brain tissue is not identical with human consciousness
and affection, but the collection of interacting neural,
physical and chemical dynamical processes occurring at
every moment of time.
1.2 Natural and synthetic emotions
An extensive literature is devoted to the question of the
introperspective content of emotions as they are expe-
rienced, see [7]. The spectrum of emotional experiences
is vast, ranging from plain fear conditioning [8] and ro-
mantic love [9], to the complexity of social interactions
[10,11]. Emotional expressions play a paramount role
in social interactions [12], and are studied increasingly
in the context of human-robot interactions [13]. These
important issues are not the subject of this review, they
1 Subject to evolutionary pressure are all traits which influ-
ence Darwinian fitness. An emotional arousal typically leads to
behavioral consequences and behavior is a primary toehold for
evolutionary selection. This evolutionary perspective sometimes
contrast with our daily experiences, as certain human emotions
are routinely viewed to be more a handicap, instead of being
benficial, when living in modern societies.
2 One may actually wonder, against the background of the fact
that our emotional suit contributes in important ways to our
Darwinian fitness, why then are emotions portrayed often as ir-
rational and counterproductive in everyday life.
are however closely related to the core questions regard-
ing the defining functional characteristics of emotional
processes.
It is clearly possible to build humanoid robots show-
ing facial expressions, which an anthropomizing observer
would interpret as emotional [14,15]. Emotional expres-
sions by socializing robots may be helpful for human-
robot interactions but clearly do not correspond to true
‘synthetic emotions’, which need to be related to behav-
ioral control [16,17,18], the focus of the present review.
1.3 Homeostasis and diffusive control
An essential aspect of the living condition is homeosta-
sis, the active regulation of biological relevant parame-
ters, like the blood-sugar level or the heart beating fre-
quency. Homeostatic regulation is also necessary for the
internal parameters of individual neurons, like mem-
brane conductivities or firing thresholds, as well as for
networks of neurons [19]. The availability of the neuro-
transmitter glutamate and GABA, to give an example,
has to be regulated through a homeostatic cycle involv-
ing the astrocytes [20] .
Complex dynamical systems, like the neural net in
the brain, need to retain their overall dynamical proper-
ties in a suitable range, they need to adjust their work-
ing point [4]. The occurrence of epileptic seizures is an
example of what can happen when homeostasis breaks
down. In addition to the homeostatic regulation, nec-
essary to retain operationability, neural circuits in the
brain also need to allow for transient modulatory adap-
tion [21]. This second type of regulation allows the neu-
ral circuits to work in several different regimes, increas-
ing e.g. the relative importance of afferent input [21]
or the relative importance of inter-neural competition
[22].
Homeostasis is fundamentally diffusive in nature.
The need to regulate the concentration of a given ion
or of a certain neurotransmitter is normally performed
non-locally. We are interested here, with regard to the
functional role of emotional control, in the diffusive con-
trol of the properties of neural circuits by neuromodu-
lators like dopamine or seretonin.
2 NEUROBIOLOGY OF EMOTIONAL AND
DIFFUSIVE CONTROL
We will now discuss a few selected aspects of the neu-
robiology of emotions relevant for understanding the
functionality of emotional control. Our aim is however
not to provide an extensive review of the neurobiologi-
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Fig. 1 The difference between cognitive and modulatory control.
A neural network is driven by an input layer and its functional
behavior regulated by the control unit. For the same stimulation
pattern from the input layer different outputs are possible, de-
pending on the signals it receives from the the control unit. When
a control signal influences the network neurons via direct synaptic
connections, the control is cognitive; if it affects the parameters
of the network neurons (dashed line with open head and tail),
like the firing threshold or the gain, see Eq. (2), the control is
modulatory.
cal foundations of emotions, for comprehensive reviews
on the subject see [8,23,24].
The neurobiological foundations of emotions are neu-
romodulators like dopamine, seretonin and the ophids
[25]. These neuromodulators are emitted by specialized
neurons originating in quite localized subcortical struc-
tures, like the raphe nucleus and the substantia nigra,
ascending to cortical areas, in particular to the pre-
frontal cortex, as well as to sub-cortical areas like the
amygdala and the hippocampus, to mention a few ex-
emplary target areas. Emotional experiences, involving
complex recurrent interactions with cognitive process-
ing [26,27], are not identical with neuromodulator con-
centrations, but there is probably no fragile or robust
emotional experience without the concurrent release of
some combination of neuromodulators.
A neuromodulator, like dopamine, is released synap-
tically. A dopaminergic neuron fires, like any other neu-
ron, and the depolarization pulse travelling along its
axon activates the dopaminergic synapses alongside its
way. The number of dopaminergic neurons is rather
small, e.g. there are about 7200 dopaminergic cells in
the substantia nigra, each one having on average about
370 000 synapses [28]. This very large number of syn-
apses per single dopaminergic neuron indicates that the
release of dopamine produces a diffusive volume effect.
Cells in the target area have appropriate receptors on
their membrane which will change certain membrane
properties when activated.
2.1 Diffusive, modulatory and cognitive control
Neuromodulators take their name since they modulate
the behavior of the neurons in the target area. Within
control theory the term “modulation” generally just im-
plies that the control effect is relatively weak with re-
spect to the eigendyamics of the target, viz modulating
and not driving. Here we will use the term “modula-
tion” in a more restricted sense, with a sharp and qual-
itative distinction between modulatory and cognitive
control.
In Fig. 1 we illustrate the difference between modu-
latory and cognitive influence and control. For concrete-
ness let us assume that a typical neuron in the network
layer of Fig. 1 has a sigmoidal activation function,
σ(r, β, θ) =
1
e−(βr−θ) + 1
,
with an activation threshold θ. The gain β encodes the
steepness and r the cognitive input,
r =
∑
i∈ input
wi xi +
∑
j ∈ control
vj yj , (1)
where the {xi} and the {yi} are neural activity levels
of the input and the control layer respectively and the
{wi} and {vi} the respective synaptic strengths. Al-
ternatively, the parameters of the activation function
σ(r, β, θ) of the network-layer neurons might be modu-
lated by the control layer,
β = β(y1, y2, . . .), θ = θ(y1, y2, . . .) . (2)
We can now clarify the different forms of possible con-
trols.
– Cognitive control
The neurons of the control layer influence upstream
layers in the same way as any other input, compare
Eq. (1), e.g. via glutamergic synaptic connections.
– Modulatory control
There are no direct (e.g. glutamergic) synaptic con-
nections from the control layer to upstream layers,
viz the vj ≡ 0 in Eq. (1). The influence on upstream
layers occurs exclusively via the (e.g. dopaminergic)
modulatory influence on the internal parameter of
upstream neurons, as in Eq. (2).
– Diffusive control
Diffusive control is modulatory. Modulatory control
could still be target specific, as a matter of prin-
ciple, viz the modulatory effect could be different
for individual target neurons. Diffusive modulatory
control is not target specific on the level of individ-
ual neurons, being a volume effect.
4The influence of neuromodulators in the brain seems to
be predominantly diffusive in above sense [28]. Neuro-
modulators can be compared to hormones on a func-
tional level, which also act diffusively. Hormones are
synthesized in certain glands, dispensed throughout the
body via the blood system and act as diffusive chemical
messengers. Both hormones and neuromodulators may
have lasting as well as phasic effects on their respec-
tive targets. Stress hormones change the actual working
stage of the body into a fight-or-flight stance, growth
hormones fulfil their task on the other side over the
course of months and years.
3 COGNITIVE SYSTEM THEORY
Let us now consider the overall picture. In Fig. 2 the
functional interdependencies between cognitive proces-
ses, environment and emotional control are illustrated.
These interdependencies hold both for real-world cogni-
tive systems, like the human cognitive system, as well
as for organismic artificial intelligences. We start the
discussion by considering the individual components.
– Cognitive processes
All standard conscious and unconscious neural ac-
tivities, like neural firing and learning via synap-
tic plasticities, belong to the class of cognitive pro-
cesses.
– Environment
Notably here is the circumstance, that the support
unit of the cognitive system, the body, belongs to
the environment. It can be acted upon, as any other
part of the environment, and the cognitive system
can obtain sensory information about it, either via
the normal sensory organs or proprioceptionally. The
body is however a very special part of the environ-
ment and plays a central role in the notion of em-
bodiment, as discussed further below. An organis-
mic cognitive system dies by definition, whenever
the support unit ceases to be operational.
– Emotional control
The emotional control plays a central role in behav-
ioral control, see Sec. 4. It is only then distinct from
cognitive information processing when a diffusive
modulatory influence on the cognitive processes is
present. Otherwise one may subsume the emotional
processes under the cognitive processes.
Note, that most models for synthetic emotions consider
emotional drives to be state variables interacting with
other state variables, like neural activity levels, cogni-
tively, e.g. via direct synaptic links [18,32]. In these
models the emotional states typically have global ef-
fects and are therefore, to a certain extend, special state
variables. They could be subsumed, nevertheless, un-
der cognitive information processing, having analogous
functionalities.
3.1 Cognitive system paradigms
In Fig. 2 the dominant interactions between the con-
stituent components of cognitive system and environ-
ment are illustrated. One needs to remember however
that environment, emotional control and cognitive pro-
cessing have all their own intrinsic and autonomous dy-
namical processes. This state of affairs is self evident
for the case of the environment, which is generally only
weakly and locally affected by the actions of the cog-
nitive system. But also the cognitive processes them-
selves, viz the neural brain activity, have strong and es-
sential autonomous components [29,30,31]. The brain is
indeed not just a glorified input-output mapper, driven
by the sensory data input stream, but a self-sustained
dynamical system of its own.
There are contrasting views with respect to the over-
all importance of the various interactions illustrated in
Fig. 2, for a full fledged cognitive system. Disregarding
many interesting details, these different views can be
stereotyped via their paradigmatic assumptions.
– Embodied cognition
The brain receives sensory information both via sen-
sory organs like eye and ears, as well as propriocep-
tual information from the own body. The paradigm
of embodied cognition states, among other things,
that the proprioceptual sensory input is not only
helpful, but an essential part of cognition [33,34].
– Embodied emotions
The emotional control system receives information
both about the environment, preprocessed cogni-
tively, as well as direct proprioceptual input from
the body. The paradigm of embodied emotions states,
that the proprioceptual information is an essential
part of emotions in general and of emotion experi-
ence in particular [35,36].
– Diffusive emotional control
The emotional control system might influence the
cognitive processes both directly or via modulatory
processes, as described in Sect. 2.1, with the modu-
latory processes being diffusive volume effects. The
paradigm of diffusive emotional control states, that
a key functionality of natural and synthetic emo-
tions involves diffusive control [37], viz that cogni-
tive emotional control alone may only mimic certain
secondary features of emotional control, but not re-
produce the core functionalities.
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Fig. 2 Functional relation between the cognitive processes, environment and emotional control. The biological support unit (the
body) and the wetware (the brain) are functionally part of the environment. The motivational drives are traditionally divided into
the primary drives and higher emotional control, the former responsible for securing daily survival, the later for optimizing life-long
Darwinian fitness. The paradigms of embodied cognition/emotion state that the proprioceptual sensory input from the body (lines
with filled arrows and circles) to the cognitive processes/emotional control is essential for for cognition/emotions. The paradigm of
diffusive emotional control states that emotions are functionally dependent on diffusive modulatory control (line with open arrow and
circle).
The term “cognitive system” is widely used in a range
of contexts, sometimes for large-scale cognitive archi-
tectures, more often however for specialized algorithms
suitable for solving certain well defined tasks. Here we
use the term cognitive system as a synonym for “organ-
ismic cognitive system” [4,5,6], as corresponding to a
full fledged synthetic or real-world cognitive system, like
the human cognitive system. The above list of paradig-
matic assumptions for cognitive systems is not meant to
be exhaustive, many others possible architectures have
been proposed. We have focused here, from the view-
point of dynamical system theory, on working principles
important for organismic cognitive systems.
The concept of diffusive emotional control, which
has its groundings in neurobiological observations, makes
a mathematically well defined proposal of how to imple-
ment synthetic emotions. Both emotional control and
homeostatic regulative processes involve modulatory con-
trol via diffusive volume processes. Indeed, as mentioned
in the introduction, emotional control is evolutionary-
wise an offspring of homeostatic control. What is then
the difference between normal or neutral and emotional
diffusive control? This riddle, which is the subject of
Sect. 4, is not resolved by the paradigm of diffusive
emotional control alone.
3.2 Cognitive feedback
We conclude the overall assessment of an organismic
cognitive system with the feedback influence of the cog-
nitive processes onto the emotional control, compare
Fig. 2.
Cognition and emotions are deeply intertwined [24,
39] and it is clear that cognitive processing influences
the emotional control via direct feedback loops. It is
possible, to give an example, to lay relaxed on a couch
with closed eyes, meditating about the happenings of
the last days and experiencing an emotional roller coaster.
Emotions can be triggered both by environmental stim-
uli as well as by cognitive processes.
The emotional control system has, in any case, no
sensory organs of its own. The emotional system can-
not obtain direct information about the environment,
all sensory input arriving to the emotional control is
cognitively preprocessed, compare Fig. 2. It is however
presently a matter of debate exactly to which cognitive
information the emotional control system has access to.
E.g. it has been argued [38], that the dopamine neu-
rons in the substantia nigra receive visual information
thought the superior colliculus, which is specialized in
localizing changes of luminance in the visual field, di-
recting, beside others, saccadic eye movements. In this
case, the dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra
6would have access only to a very limited and specialized
sector of cognitive information.
The fundamental drives like hunger and pain are
less influenced by cognitive feedback, and more driven
by signaling from the body. The distinction between
the fundamental drives and the higher emotional con-
trol can be made precise, when identifying the drives
with the “primary survival parameters” [37], viz with
the set of parameters regulating the survival of the
body. In this interpretation the level of blood sugar,
the heart beating frequency and the level of pain, to
mention a few, need to be kept homeostatically in a
certain range by the cognitive system for the support
unit to retain operationability. We die when our blood
sugar level raises above, or falls below, a certain critical
level.
4 NEUTRAL VS. EMOTIONAL CONTROL
Our discussion has led us so far to two points:
– Substantial support from neurobiology indicates, that
the neuromodulatory system acts via diffusive vol-
ume processes. The effect of a neuromodulator on
the neurons in the target area is modulatory and
not cognitive. The neuromodulators do not affect
the actual firing states or the membrane potentials
directly, modulating the internal parameters like fir-
ing thresholds, learning rates, etc. With emotions
being linked to the concurrent release of neuromod-
ulators, these results have important consequence
for models of synthetic emotions. Models of emo-
tions involving cognitive emotional control, instead
of diffusive control, may be useful for applications,
but will not lead in the end to ‘true synthetic emo-
tions’.
– The neuromodulatory system is part of the web of
homeostatic regulations. The vast majority of home-
ostatic processes occurring in our bodies and in the
brain are however neutral, not evoking emotional
experiences. Which key functionalities then differ-
entiate neutral from emotional control? This is the
question we are addressing in the present section.
A word of caution. We will propose here a functional
difference between neutral and emotional homeostatic
control, based both on theoretical as well as on neu-
robiological considerations, a proposal which is imple-
mentable and such also falsifiable. Whether or not func-
tional properties of emotional control alone suffice for
an explanation of emotional experiences is presently
however unclear. We start our discussion by considering
the motivational problem.
4.1 The motivational problem
Any organismic cognitive system has to take actions.
The question is then which actions and for which pur-
poses. We propose there that this motivational problem
can be classified, cum grano salis, into two separate time
windows.
– Day-to-day survival
The task to keep the body healthy on a daily ba-
sis is job of the primary drives, which take their
input from survival parameters, see Sect. 3.2 and
Fig. 2. The survival parameters, like the heart beat-
ing frequency, signal proprioceptually the status of
the support unit to the cognitive system. The re-
sulting primary drives, like hunger and reproduc-
tion, constitute the only set of motivational drives
for primitive organismic cognitive systems.
– Life-long Darwinian fitness
The survival probability, over the lifespan of an in-
dividual, and the overall number of offsprings, can
benefit from complex behavioral strategies which
transcend the requirements for day-to-day survival.
Optimizing life-long Darwinian fitness is a primary
task of emotional control.
Two examples: Many animals will engage in social ac-
tivities when immediate survival is not at stake, im-
proving such lifelong survivability (securing the pro-
tection of the kins) and Darwinian fitness (increasing
the chances of obtaining a mate). Many humans will
engage in explorative activities when being bored, viz
when the operational status of mind and body is close
to optimality. General explorative behaviour, viz explo-
ration without an explicit goal, may indeed potentially
increase longer-term fitness, e.g. when finding a shel-
ter for the next winter, or when discovering additional
nutriment sources for possible times of hardness.
The existence of deep interrelations between emo-
tional control, decision making and behavior is well es-
tablished [40,41,42]. Indeed the notion of empathy, the
possibility to understand deeply the feelings of other
persons, is important in social contexts since empathic
understanding allows to predict the likely future course
of actions of your counterpart [44]. The mere fact that
empathy evolved through evolutionary selection there-
fore directly implies that emotional control constitutes
a key player in behavioral control.
Emotions have a twofold functionality for behav-
ioral control. On one side they establish general moods
of direct behavioral relevance, like boredom in the ex-
ample above. Cognitively evaluated plans and targets
are, in addition, emotionally weighted, a precondition
for decision making in the framework of both short- and
7long-term planing. Policy making is therefore intrin-
sically dependent, also for highly developed cognitive
systems, on a solid emotional grounding, the biological
counterpart to the value function used in the context
of reinforcement learning [43].
The here postulated separation of time scales for
instincts and emotional control needs to be interpreted
non-exclusively. Instincts contribute to the long-term
fitness, but only indirectly through a succession of short-
term survivals. Emotional control can contribute how-
ever directly both to the prospective life-long fitness
and to the daily survival rate.
4.2 Emotional control vs. utility maximization
One may then ask oneself [22,37], which is the advan-
tage of having, in addition to the primary drives like
hunger and reproduction, an additional layer of motiva-
tional drives, the emotional control. A mainstream hy-
pothesis in artificial intelligence research assumes, that
high-level synthetic cognitive systems having life-long
utility maximization as their sole motivational drive
[45], may eventually be constructed. The artificial cog-
nitive system would then, in this view, take into con-
sideration all facts known about the environment, make
a large computational effort, and maximize directly a
preset utility function.
Emotional control in mammals works however in-
directly. Emotions do in general not direct the behav-
ior towards a straight-forward utility maximization, e.g.
when exploring the environment when nothing else is to
do. We believe that general, emotionally induced, be-
havioral strategies are an essential part of behavioral
control in the face of complex environments. Any real-
world cognitive system is confronted with a shortage of
three types of resources:
– information about the environment is (extremely)
limited,
– the computational resources (of the brain) finite and
– the time available for taking decisions is (very) short.
The scarceness of theses three resources makes it im-
possible for an organismic cognitive system to optimize
directly Darwinian fitness over longer time spans, like
weeks, months and years. Emotionally regulated behav-
ior has proven itself, through selection and evolution, to
be a feasible route to achieve high levels of Darwinian
fitness when only modest resources (information, com-
putational capabilities and time) are available.
Emotional control achieves computational effective-
ness by providing general evaluation benchmarks, mak-
ing situation-specific evaluations, which are computa-
tionally expensive and very time consuming, dispens-
able. Consider a paleolithic tribe wandering around in
search for a place to settle. They will likely direct their
pace towards places looking nice, like a savannah inter-
spersed with patches of forest, or a small stream with
sheltering rocks. This emotional valuation, ‘this place
looks welcoming’, is based on a very small subset of
potentially available information. It can be performed
very fast and is computationally affordable, having a
substantial influence on the longer-term Darwinian fit-
ness of the tribe-members.
A utility maximization procedure would correspond
in this situation, on the other side, to a realistic as-
sessment of the perspectives: how may heads of game
will we be able to hunt here during the next few months,
howmany roots and vegetables will we be able to gather,
which is the likelihood of a forest-fire, and so on. A rig-
orous utility maximization would clearly need a sub-
stantial investment of time and resources for data ac-
quisition and evaluation, a luxury not available in most
situations.
4.3 Homeostatic interactions
Emotions correspond to homeostasis at the behavioral
level [46]. Is there then a functional difference, which
makes certain homeostatic regulation by neuromodula-
tors ‘emotional’, in contrast to automatic homeostatic
processes, which we may term ‘neutral’? A vast body of
clinical data shows that emotions and the organization
of behavior through motivational drives are intrinsically
related [16,47,48,42]
Highly developed cognitive systems need to acquire
adequate response strategies for given states of emo-
tional arousal. When angry, to give an example, one has
to find out which actions are suitable for reducing this
unpleasant level of arousal. These response actions are
generally not genetically predetermined, since quite dis-
parate environmental situations may lead to increased
levels of angriness: shooing away an annoying fly is an
utterly different action than settling a quarrel with a
spouse.
Response strategies are acquired algorithmically via
reinforcement or temporal-difference learning [43]. These
learning processes make use of reward signals and a
given behavioral response will be enhanced or suppressed
for positive and negative reward signals respectively, a
well-known candidate for a reward signal in the brain
being dopamine [28,49].
Emotional diffusive control is therefore charac-
terized by a coupling of the regulative event to
the generation of reward signals for subsequent
reinforcement learning processes.
8It has been proposed [37], that this coupling is the char-
acteristic hallmark of emotional control, differentiating
it to neural control processes.
Which are the conditions for the generation of the
reward signals coupled to emotional control? Let us
come back to above example. If we are angry, we will
generally try to perform actions with the intent of re-
ducing our level of arousal. Angriness is reduced when
this goal is achieved, and a positive mood follows, viz
a positive reward signal has been generated, reinforc-
ing the precedent behavior. The generation of reward
signals is hence coupled to the arousal level of the emo-
tional control processes. The distinguishing attribute
of emotional control is therefore a genetically prede-
termined activation or arousal level. Deviations from
this preferred range of activation will lead to positive
or negative reinforcement signals.
We conclude this section with a note of caveat. The
functional characterization of emotional control given
above makes no statement regarding the preconditions
necessary for emotional experiences. Introspectively the
qualia of emotional experiences is qualitatively different
from cognitive reasoning and thinking. It is presently
unclear which attributes of the emotional circuits are
essential for emotional experiences. Embodiment may
play a crucial role in this respect. Emotions standardly
influence the status of the body via the release of hor-
mones, like adrenaline, and we are in part able to sense
proprioceptually the resulting bodily effects. In this view
the experience of emotions would correspond to propri-
oceptual perception [50].
5 CONCLUSIONS
Discussing the functional role of emotional control we
have identified two core properties:
– Emotional control via appropriate neuromodulators
correspond to diffusive modulation of the neural ac-
tivity and not to direct cognitive control.
– Emotional control is part of the homeostatic control
system with the difference being that the level of
emotional arousal is linked to the release of positive
or negative reinforcement learning signals.
These findings, which are based on neurobiological and
clinical observations, have two implications. On one side
they specify mathematically well characterized func-
tional features of diffusive emotional control and are
therefore implementable for synthetic cognitive systems.
They are, on the other hand, quite general statements
and a myriad of interesting and important additional
details are needed in order to obtain a deeper under-
standing of emotional control. In this context we have
presented an hypothesis regarding the benefit of emo-
tional control for the Darwinian fitness of an organismic
cognitive system, arguing that it contributes to the op-
timization of both life-long fitness and daily survival,
with the later being the domain of motivational control
through instincts.
We have emphasized in this review the functional
differences between emotional control and cognitive com-
putation. On the other side we have also pointed out
that both cognition and emotional control are two in-
dispensable components of any full-fledged organismic
cognitive system. The motivational problem cannot be
solved by cognition alone, any highly developed cogni-
tive system would remain goal-less stranded and dis-
oriented without solid and well developed emotional
groundings.
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